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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
DANIEL L. PECK, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 14,3 37 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a jury verdict in which the defendant 
was charged with aggravated assault and was found to be auilty in 
that he did, with unlawful force and violence, knowingly and inten-
tionally cause serious bodily injury to another. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The matter was tried on March 20, .1975, before a jury. The 
State accused the defendant of violating 76-5-102 (1) (2). and 76-5-
103(1) (a), Utah Criminal Code Amended, which violations are a fel-
ony of the third degree. The jury found the defendant guilty as 
charged. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment and a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Daniel Peck was charged with the offense of aggravated as-
sault. The alleged assau.lt rose out of a fist fight involving 
Daniel Peck, Jimmy Peck, Clarence "Junior" Nielson, Jr., and Garv 
Ewell. The fight occurred on Saturday, December 7, 1974, at ap-
. •• - 1 -
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proximately 1:15 p.m., in American Fork, Utah. (Tr. 14) 
Accusations by Junior Nielson that the Peck boys had stolen 
some Christmas trees led to the fracus. The incident eventually 
leading to the fight was a night-time visit to Jimmy Peck's home 
on December 7, 1974, at 1:00 a.m. by Clarence Nielson. Nielson, 
the owner of a Christmas tree lot in American Fork, told Jimmy's 
wife that the Peck brothers had stolen Christmas trees from him. 
The next morning, Jimmy Peck's wife told him of these accusations 
made by Nielson. The charges so incensed Jimmy that he telephoned 
Nielson. A heated conversation ensued. The aftermath was that 
Ewell and Nielson were challenged to a fist fight. Ewe11 and 
Nielson responded and met the two Peck brothers at Sam White's 
lane in American Fork. (Tr* 15) 
Junior Nielson and Jimmy Peck squared off while Ewell and 
Danny Peck watched. The Peck boy appeared to be winning the 
fight when Junior, (Tr. 17) who had a headhold on Jimmy (Tr. 3 4) 
then let him go and stopped fighting, whereupon Ewell, fresh and 
well-rested, commenced to fight a tired Jimmy Peck, who doggedly 
fought Ewell all the while retreating down the street. They con-
tinued to fight out into an open field. Danny Peck and Junior 
Nielson watched and were joined by Harry Peacock, who also was 
a spectator. (Tr. 15) 
The State claims that at this point, when the fighters were 
in the field and the fight was almost finished, that Daniel Peck, 
of diminutive size, who had been an observer watching from his 
vehicle suddenly emerged with a slag hammer and "rushed over, 
took a swing with the slag hammer, and tore Gary Ewell's eye 
out." (Tr. 6) 
-2-
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Danny Peck claims he thought his brother was being killed by 
Junior Nielson and Gary Ewell when they both had Jimmy down, one 
gouging Jimmy's eyes, and the other getting him by the hair so they 
could either kick or hit him in the face* At this point, Danny, 
thinking his brother's life was endangered, intervened with a piece 
of metal and struck Junior, who was gouging Jimmy's eyes. Gary 
Ewell, who lost his eye, was in back of Danny Peck and as Danny 
turned, "the metal apparently hit Ewell in the eye." (Tr. 10) 
Jimmy Peck testified: (Tr. 69) 
. . .He (Nielson) hit me and I fell down, and 
he crawled on top of me and was hitting me, and 
I rolled over on my stomach to cover myself up 
so he couldn't hit me in the face. I just roll-
ed over on my stomach and he was on my back, Jun-
ior was, and he was hitting me on the back, and 
he grabbed me by the face like this and tried to 
pull my head up. He had his fingers in my face 
like this and digging my face and eyes trying 
to pull my face up. I had my head down and my 
hands up- trying — so he couldn't hit me, and 
then someone come over and grabbed me by the 
hair of the head trying to pull my head up. 
The defendant, Daniel Peck, testified: (Tr. 78) 
A. At that time Junior was on Jimmy's back and 
had his fingers in his eyes pulling his head 
back, and Ewell had his head up like that by the 
hair and was lifting his head up and either Jun-
ior or Ewell, one of them, was saying, "Get 
his head up to where I can get him or kick him." 
something to that effect. 
Q. What was your reaction to this at this time? 
A. Well, I could see they wasn't going to quit 
and I had asked them three or four times. And 
I didn't know what else to do, so I just — 
Q. What did you say to them? 
A. I told them to quit and leave him alone, and 
Junior pushed me back in the car and took a swing 
at me the first time, and then I asked them three 
or four times to quit and leave him alone and 
quit pounding on him, and they just — 
-3-
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Q. What was Ewell doing particularly as far as 
Jimmy was concerned? 
A. He had him by the hair of the head and was 
lifting him up by the hair of the head and he 
had his hand back like that. (Indicating) 
Q. What did you do? 
A. I jumped out of the car and I grabbed this 
bar that I had in the back of the car and I hit 
Junior with it and he fell off, and as I did I 
seen Ewell coming and I turned around like that, 
and when I did that is when it hit Ewell. 
Q. Did you swing the bar at Ewell? 
A. I didn't swing it at him actually, no. 
Q. What did you do? You say you turned around. 
A. I seen him coming when I hit Junior, and I 
turned around like that and I felt it hit him. 
Then I looked at him and he had his hands on his 
eye, and then that was the first I even knew I 
had hit him. 
POINT I 
THE COURT'S FAILURE TO INSTRUCT ON THE LESSER-INCLUDED 
OFFENSE OF SIMPLE ASSAULT WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR BECAUSE A CONVIC-
TION OF THE DEFENDANT FOR SIMPLE ASSAULT WOULD BE WARRANTED BY 
ANY REASONABLE VIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. 
The well-established general rule is that a jury should be 
instructed on lesser-included offenses when such a conviction 
would be warranted by any reasonable view of the evidence. Sec-
tion 77-33-6, U.C.A., 1953, as amended, provides: 
The jury may find the defendant quilty 
of any offense the commission of which is 
necessarily included in that with which he 
is charged in the indictment or information, 
or of an attempt to commit the offense. 
The offense of simple assault is necessarily included in the of-
fense of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. State v. Hun-
-4-
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ter, 20 Utah 2d 284, 437 P. 2d 208 (1968); State v. Barkas, 91 
Utah 574, 65 P.2d 1130.(1937); State v, Nielson, 30 Utah 2d 19, 
514 P.2d 535 (1973). The elements of assault are common in both 
offenses. 
The Utah Supreme Court has affirmed the general rule requir-
ing the submission of lesser-included offenses when the evidence 
and circumstances so justify. State v. Johnson, 112 Utah 130, 
185 P.2d 738 (1947); State v. Castillo, 23 Utah 2d 70, 457 P.2d 
618 (1969); State v. Gilliam, 23 Utah 2d 372, 463 P.2d 811 (1970). 
As case authority, defendant cites State v. Close, 28 Utah 
2d 144, 499 P.2d 287 (1972), in which the defendant was charged 
with indecent assault on a child under fourteen years of age while 
in a public swimming pool in the middle of the afternoon while he 
was playing with a number of children and performing various gvm-
nastics by tossing them about and flipping them over in the water. 
After being convicted, the defendant, on appeal, complained of 
the court's failure to instruct the jury on the lesser-included 
offense of simple assault. The Utah Supreme Court reversed for 
failure to so instruct and Justice Crockett, speaking for the 
Court, said: 
Though it is not our prerogative to 
pass upon the weight or credibility of the 
evidence, we are concerned with whether 
there is a basis therein which would justi-
fy a verdict of guilty of the lesser offense. 
Id. at 288. 
It was held error for the trial court to not so instruct on the 
lesser-included offense because there was a basis in the evidence 
that would justify a quilty verdict on the lesser-included offense 
Even the rationale of Justice El "Lett's dissent in State v. 
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Close, supra, supports appellant1s position. Justice Ellett, dis-
senting, stated: 
The law seems to be that the failure to 
instruct on a lesser and included offense 
would be error only if the defendant can show 
that the jury upon evidence before it might 
rationally acquit him of the greater charge 
and convict him of the lesser. Id» at 289. 
In accord with the dissent, the defendant presented evidence in 
the instant case that might lead the jury to rationally acquit 
him of the greater charge of aggravated assault and still convict 
him of the lesser charge of simple assault. 
Simple assault is statutorily defined as "an attempt, with 
unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to another." 
Aggravated assault is statutorily defined as involving one who 
"uses a deadly weapon or such means or force likely to produce 
death or serious bodily injury." 
The instructions given as to the crime alleged must be appli-
cable to the testimony introduced at trial. In the instamt case, 
there was evidence in the record that Daniel Peck thought that 
Jimmy Peck's life was endangered* Danny Peck testified (Tr. 78): 
A. At that time Junior was on Jimmy's back 
and had his fingers in his eyes pulling his head 
back, and Ewell had his head up like that by the 
hair and was lifting his dead up and either Jun-
ior or Ewell, one of them, was saying, "Get his 
head up to where I can get him or kick him," some-
thing to that effect. 
Q. What was your reaction to this at this 
time? 
A. Well, I could see they wasn't going to 
quit and I had asked them three or four times* 
And I didn't know what else to do, so I just — 
Danny Peck testified he did not intend to cause serious bod-
ily injury to Gary Ewell. He was only trving to defend his bro-
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ther from what appeared to him to have become a deadly assault 
by two persons against Jimmy Peck. Daniel Peck testified to 
the effect that he had no intention of injuring Gary Ewell. (Tr. 
80) ' 
A. I seen him (Gary Ewell) coming when I 
hit Junior, and I turned around like that and I 
felt it hit him. Then I looked at him and he 
had his hand on his eye, and then that was the 
first I even knew I had hit him. 
Q. Did you intend to hit Ewell at that 
time? 
A. No, I didn't. 
The blow struck was accidental. It is clearly inferable from the 
defendant's testimony that he did not have the intent to commit 
serious bodily injury required of the crime of aggravated assault 
and instead could be found quilty of the lesser-included offense 
of simple assault. Daniel Peck, by his own testimony, raised 
the issue of his state of mind as to whether he intended serious 
bodily injury to the victim. He clearly testified of a lack of 
intent to do serious bodily injury to Ewell. 
As further case authority, appellant cites State v. Barkas, 
supra, in which defendant Barkas, who was a sheep-herder, was 
with his sheep in;the mountains west of Bingham when Cordova, a 
former sheep-herder of Barkas1, climbed up to the mountains to-
ward the camp to collect the sum of $4.28 which he claimed Barkas 
owed him. As Cordova came over a ridge, he saw Barkas coming 
over the next ridge and went down into the draw and met him. 
Barkas who had a shotgun in his right hand and a revolver in his 
left, asked Cordova what he was doing there. Cordova replied he 
had come up to collect the $4.28 due him. Without further words 
Barkas raised both weapons and pointed them at Cordova. Cordova 
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grabbed the hand that held the revolver and attempted to push it 
down. Barkas tried to raise the arm and pistol. In the struggle, 
the pistol was discharged, wounding Cordova in the leg. Cordova, 
under orders, started down the trail. After going about 100 
yards, Barkas ordered him to stop and pull down his pants to see 
if he had been shot. Cordova replied that he had not been hit. 
Barkas then accused Cordova of being up there stealing sheep. 
Barkas was prosecuted for assault with a deadly weapon with intent 
to do bodily harm and was convicted. On appeal, Barkas raised the 
issue of whether the trial court should have properly instructed 
on the lesser-included offense of simple assault. The Utah Sup-
reme Court said such an instruction should have been given and 
reversed the trial court's decision, stating; 
And if the jury believed Cordova's story 
of how the shooting occurred, they might well 
find a verdict on a lesser charge. Cordova 
testified that without words spoken defendant 
pointed a pistol at him with one hand, and a 
shotgun with the other hand, and demanded to 
know what he was doing there* This, if done 
with the intention of frightening, or intimi-
dating or interfering with Cordova would con-
stitute a technical or simple assault, which 
is a threat or attempt to interfer with one's 
sense or feeling of physical security and put 
one in fear for his safety. Cordova further 
testified that he grabbed defendant's pistol 
arm, and in the struggle the pistol was dis-
charged wounding him in the leg. This is not 
inconsistent with the conviction that the 
shooting was accidental and not done inten-
tionally to hurt Cordova, in which event it 
would only be a simple assault. Such con-
clusions are not beyond reason, and the jurv 
should have been permitted to consider them 
and pass upon them. Id. at 1132 & 1133. 
(emphasis added) 
In both State V. Barkas, supra, and the instant case, the 
defendants were charged with assault with a deadly weapon. In 
both cases the defendant testified that the wound inflicted was 
-8-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
accidental. The crime of simple assault may be committed by a 
wanton or reckless act. 6 Am.Jur.2d, Assault and Battery, §3 4. 
It is defendant's contention that if the victim was not wounded 
intentionally but rather was wounded accidentally as a result 
of defendant's wanton and reckless act then there would be com-
mitted only a simple assault. Such a conclusion is not beyond 
reason in the instant case because there was evidence before 
the trier of facts indicating that such was the case. 
In State v. Hyams, 64 Utah 285, 230 P. 349- (1924), the de-
fendant was charged with an assault with intent to feloniously 
and by force and violence carnally know and ravish a married wo-
man not his wife. Defendant's counsel requested the court to 
charge that although the defendant was charged with the offense 
of assault to commit rape, the jury might neverthe less find him 
quilty of simple assault. The court refused to so charge and 
counsel assigned the court's refusa] as constituting prejudicial 
error. The Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court's con-
viction stating: 
It might well be the case that, although 
a trial court had refused or omitted to sub-
mit to the jury the question of included or 
lesser offenses, the judgment would neverthe-
less not be reversed for that reason alone, 
if the evidence was of such a nature as would 
not justify a finding of an included or lesser 
offense. In such event no prejudice would re-
sult from the mere fact that the question of 
included or lesser offenses was not submitted 
to the jury. It is, however, always a 
delicate matter for a trial court to withhold 
from the jury the right to find the accused 
quilty of a lesser or included offense, and 
determine the question of the state of the 
evidence as matter of law. That should be 
done only in very clear cases. Id. at 350. 
The state of the evidence in the instant case is not so clear cut 
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as to require an instruction only on aggravated assault. 
Other jurisdictions are in accord with the Utah Supreme 
Court. See Holland v. State, 414 P.2d 590 (Okla.,1966), in which 
the Nevada Supreme Court stated: 
. . .it was not incumbent upon the 
court to instruct on the lesser offense 
if the evidence clearly shows the commis-
sion of the more serious crime charged 
and no other interpretation of the defen-
dant's conduct was reasonably possible. 
Id. at 591. 
The evidence in the instant case did not unequivocably and clear-
ly show guilt above the lesser—included offense of simple assault. 
The evidence in the instant case was insufficient to remove a 
reasonable doubt, which might be in the minds of the jury, as to 
Danny Peckfs intent. Under the same evidence, Peck might be 
found quilty of simple assault because the proof necessary to 
establish the intent to use a deadly weapon to inflict serious 
bodily injury or death upon Gary Ewell was lacking but there was 
sufficient evidence to establish the crime of simple assault upon 
the victim. Also see State v. Jaramillo, 82 N.M. 548, 484 P.2d 
768 (1971); Gist v. State, 509 P.2d 149 (Okla, 1973); People v. 
Velasquez, 497 P.2d 12 (Colo. 1972). Also see State v. Lytle, 177 
Kan. 408, 280 P.2d 924 (1955), in which the Supreme Court of Kansas 
stated: 
There is no doubt that the trial court 
in any criminal proceeding must instruct on 
all lesser degrees of the crime charged ir-
respective of the weight of evidence touch-
ing thereon if there is any evidence. Id. at 
928. (emphasis added) 
The late timing of defendants exceptions to the instructions 
which were done after the jury returned a verdict is not fatal to 
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its appeal. Judge Henroid, in State v. Close, supra, stated: 
Hence, an objection or exception taken 
after the jury's retirement, for my money is 
just as valid an exception,—and more so,— 
than one taken before—and has as much stature . 
on appeal in spite of the dissent1s implication 
that"is hasnft. The fact that the exception 
was made after the jury verdict seems inconse-
quential. Id, at 289. 
Danny Peck, the defendant, was charged with aggravated as-
sault. Under a reasonable view of the evidence, the accused 
could have been found guilty of simple assault and, therefore,, 
it was prejudicial error and deprived him of a substantial right 
when the court failed to instruct on simple assault. 
POINT II 
IT WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR FOR THE COURT TO PREVENT THE DEFEN-
DANT FROM TESTIFYING AS TO HIS STATE OF MIND BECAUSE SUCH EVIDENCE 
WAS ESSENTIAL TO DEFENDANT'S PLEA OF DEFENSE OF A THIRD PARTY. 
The state of mind of the defendant in assault cases is impor-
tant in the determination of whether a person is privileged to 
defend a third person from serious harm. Judge Sorensen did not 
allow Daniel Peck to testify as to his state of mind. (Tr. 78 and 
79) 
Q. What was your apprehension, if any, 
as far as your brother concerned? 
MR. WOOTTON: We object. 
THE COURT: I will sustain the objection. 
Q. (By Mr. Lewis) Tell us what vour 
reaction was at this time. 
A* Well, it looked to me like — 
MR. WOOTTON: We object. 
THE COURT: I will sustain the objection. 
-11-
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He can testify as to what hapuened and what 
was said, Mr* Lev/is. Not his personal feel-
ing. 
"•MR* LEWIS: I think I am entitled to in-
quire the reason therefor* 
THE COURT: I will sustain the objection. 
Proceed. 
The intention of Danny Peck v/as an integral part of his plea of 
self-defense. In Carter v. State, 507 P.2d 932 (Okla. 1973), the 
Court stated: 
The law recognizes that a person is 
privileged to defend a third person from 
harm under the same conditions and by the 
same means as though under and by which he 
is privileged to defend himself, if he 
reasonably believes that the circumstances 
are such as to give the third person such 
a privilege of self-defense, his interven-
tion is necessary for the protection of 
the third person, and the third person is 
a member of his immediate family or a per-
son whom he is under a legal or socially 
recognized duty to protect. Restatement, 
Torts, §76. 6 Am.Jur.2d, Assault and Bat-
tery, §152. Id. at 933 and 934. (emphasis 
added) 
The general rule is stated in 1 Jones on Evidence, §4:55 
(6th ed. 1972), thus: 
While there are authorities holding 
that a party may not testify directly 
concerning his own uncommunicated mental 
status, motives or intent, and that such 
matters must be shown by proof of facts and 
circumstances attending the transaction 
in dispute, it is the general rule, appli-
cable in civil and criminal cases alike, 
and sustained by the great weight of auth-
ority, that whenever the motive, intention 
or belief of a person is in issue, the 
direct testimony of such person whether 
he is a party to the suit or not, is rele-
vant to the issue of such motive, intent 
or belief, notwithstanding the fact that 
his interest may tend to diminish the 
credit to be accorded to his testimony. 
Such testimony has been admitted in vary-
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ing situations. 
Such testimony was admitted in State v. Stenbach, 78 Utah 
350, 2 P.2d 1050 (1931), in which the Utah Supreme Court, in re-
versing a conviction of murder in the first degree, stated: 
The question of whether the defendant 
did or did not intend to kill the deceased 
goes to the very essence of the crime 
charged. "In every crime or public offen-
se, there must exist a union or joint oper-
ation of act and intent, or criminal negli-
gence." Comp. Laws Utah 1917, § 7908. The 
intention to take the life of Mrs. Mantyla 
is an essential an element of the crime of 
murder in the first degree as is the kill-
ing itself. We quote the following from 
Jones Commentaries on Evidence (2d Ed.) 
vol. 2, § 713, pp. 1336, 1337: "Now that . 
defendants are permitted to testify in 
their own behalf, there can be no valid rea-
son assigned why they should not be allowed 
to testify to the intent with which any act 
was done, where such intent is a fact nec-
essary to be ascertained." Id. at 1056 and 
1057/ 
Judge Sorensen's failure to allow the defendant to testify 
as to his intention was prejudicial because it emasculated the 
defendant's plea of self-defense. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court's failure to allow the defendant to testify as to 
his intention and its failure to instruct on simple assault de-
prived the defendant of precious and fundamental rights and vio-
lated the principle that the Court must submit the case to the 
jury for consideration on every degree of assault which the evi-
dence, in any reasonable view, suggests, therefore, the verdict 
should be reversed and a new trial ordered. 
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Respectfully j^ ubitpLttesL,-:-
^—T^.^y, /^c^>^-<^-^ 
^ L.^ .^  RE X^ LEWIS, for: 
- *7 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attornevs for Defendant-Aopellant 
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